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Abstract -------------------------------
This paper estimates demand for health equations using three waves of data from the European 
Community Household Panel. The economic model is a typical specification of Grossman's [1] 
proposal. The paper focuses on three specific points: i) the existence of two stages in the 
demand for health decision process (to contact a physician and how often to visit him). ii) the 
analysis of this double-hurdle process in different scenarios (visits to the general practitioners, 
the specialists and the dentists). iii) the analysis of differences across countries due to the 
differences on the coverage of the National Insurance Systems. The results suggest that the 
contact and frequency decisions of visits to either the general practitioner, the specialist or even 
the dentist are governed by different stochastic processes. As expected, we find some 
differences in the behaviour of men and women, mainly in the decisions to visit and the number 
of visits to specialist. We also show that the behavioural differences across countries are not 
extremely important, being perhaps income a determinant of the decision to contact and the 
intensity of the treatment in poor countries. 
Keywords: count data; poisson; negbin hurdle model. 
JEL Classification: C25, C42 
* Jimenez-Martin, Departamento de Economia, Universidad CarIos III de Madrid. E-mail: 
jimenez@eco.uc3m.es; Labeaga, Departamento de Economia, Universidad Nacional de 
Educaci6n a Distancia (UNED). E-mail: jlabeaga@cee.uned.es; Martinez-Granado, 
Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. E-mail: mmartine@eco.uc3m.es 
** We are very grateful to the participants in the 9th Health and Econometrics Workshop and 
specially to Eddy van Doorslaer, Daniele Fabbri and Andrew Jones for helpful comments. This 
study was supported by an unrestricted educational grant from The Merck Foundation, the 
philanthropic arm of Merck & Co. Inc. Whitehouse Styation, New Jersey, USA." and by DGES 
PB98-1 058-C03-02/03. 
INTRODUCTION 
The main concern ofthis paper is to estimate demand for health care equations using three waves of 
data from the European Community HousehoLd PaneL. While the economic model is a typical 
specification of Grossman' s [1] proposal, we use several count data models for testing different 
hypotheses concerning the demand for health decision processes. More specifically the paper addresses 
three points: i) it examines the existence of two stages on the demand for health care, namely the 
decision to contact a physician and the decision about how often to visit him, which are typically taken 
by different decision makers (see Pohlmeier and Ulrich [2] relating the demand of health and Jones [3] 
for the demand of tobacco). ii) it analyses this hurdle process in different count data equations 
corresponding to general practitioners, specialists and dentists. iii) it identifies behavioural differences 
across the countries in the sample, possibly due to heterogeneity or differences in the health insurance 
coverage among them. 
Grossman's model of demand for health care is easily derived from a utility maximisation 
problem and ignoring that the physician can induce the demand (Cromwell and Michell [4]) or can take 
the decision about future contacts (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, [2]). However the demand for health is often a 
more complicated process: sometimes the patient only decides whether to visit a general practitioner 
(GP). In this case continuation visits to the GP or induced visits to a specialist do not depend on the first 
decision-maker (see Kenkel and Terza [5] or Kenkel [6]). In other occasions a patient does not purchase 
health from a general practitioner but she tries to acquire more or better information about her health 
status in order to make decisions. In all these cases, the demand for health is unobserved and that should 
be taken into account in any empirical specification. 
All these issues suggest the convenience of setting up different models for analysing the visits 
to different types of physicians. We are interested on testing whether hurdle models adequately identify 
this double decision process based only on the number of visits to the physicians and without 
information about the number of spells (see Santos Silva and Windmeijer [7]). We use for the analysis 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) that collects the necessary information for a set of 
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European countries. The differences on the National Insurance Systems among these countries allow us 
to identify a different behaviour both on the part of individuals and on the part of health providers. 
All the models are estimated by maximum likelihood. We do control by country specific 
heterogeneity (both in the intercept and slope of the equations) although we do not exploit the panel 
nature of our data (see Crepon and Duguet [8] or Santos-Silva and Windmeijer [9]) except for the fact 
that we pool information from several waves in order to construct predetermined explanatory variables, 
which avoids most of the potential simultaneity issues that arises in this type of analysis. Consequently, 
we use predetermined (one period lagged) variables relating labour force status, job characteristics, 
health and income . The results suggest that the contact and the frequency decisions of visits to either 
the general practitioner, the specialist or even the dentist are governed by different stochastic processes. 
We find some differences in the behaviour of men and women, mainly in the decisions to visit and the 
number of visits to the specialist. We also show that the behavioural differences across countries are not 
extremely important, being perhaps income a determinant of the decision to contact and the intensity of 
the treatment in Southern countries. 
The rest of the paper contains four sections. Section 2 describes the data source and the 
theoretical framework adopted in the paper. We specify the model and explain the econometric 
techniques in Section 3. The empirical results together with some diagnostic tests are reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
DATA AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 
Visits to General Practitioners, Specialists and Dentists: Data and stylised facts 
In the literature on demand for health it is easy to derive a model using the standard approach by 
Grossman [1], either including or not household production, when one ignores the role of the physician 
in the prescription of a treatment. In this paper we are interested in taking account of both the physician 
and the patient decisions within the same framework. Mullahy [10] summarises several alternatives of 
doing so. In all of them the demand for health shows two stages. First, the patient decides to seek for 
medical assistance (in some cases she only seeks to improve information about her health, Kenkel [6]). 
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In the second stage, both the patient and the physician play a role in deciding the intensity of the 
treatment. 
The process described above is probably valid for most European countries at least with respect 
to the decision of visiting some type of physicians, although it is not a general rule. However most of 
the departures from the mentioned process are normally related to the coverage of the Insurance 
Systems in each country. For instance, a visit to a specialist has to be prescribed by the GP in most of 
the countries considered, while visits (or at least first contacts) to GP or the dentist are completely 
decided by the patient. In these circumstances, the decision process could be more complex in the case 
of the visits to specialists. 
A simple look to the data helps to shed some light on the aims of our study. The data set 
corresponds to the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) conducted since 1994 (see Peracchi 
[11] for a description of the features of the survey). We use the public release of waves 1 to 3 which 
contains valid information, for the purposes of this paper, on 12 European countries. Despite that the 
ECHP focuses on household income and living conditions across EU15 countries it still provides 
interesting information on individual health and related issues. Apart from the traditionally asked 
questions on health status, such as a self-statement on global health or whether the person is hampered 
in daily activities, the survey includes some additional ones. More specifically, it records whether the 
individual has any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or disability. Individuals are also 
asked if they have been admitted to a hospital as in-patients (the number of nights spent in a hospital as 
in-patient are confidential information for Germany and therefore will not be used in this study). 
Finally, the survey collects information on how many times an individual has consulted a doctor, a 
dentist or an optician during the past 12 months (visits to a doctor, optician or dentist are aggregated for 
the first wave) which allows us to construct some measures of health demand as the quantity of health 
services purchased. 
Lets concentrate on the latter pieces of information namely the counts of visits to GPs, 
specialists and dentists. Table 1 shows a crude descriptive information on the zeros and positive counts 
in the 12 countries (out of 15) that are analysed herein. Several remarks are in order as regards 
contacting a physician. First of all, women visit more often doctors than men do at practically all ages. 
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In all countries it is more frequent to visit a GP than a dentist, and to visit any of them than to visit a 
specialist (being Spain and Portugal exceptions). However, the comparison between dentists and 
specialists is age dependent. There is more over-dispersion of GP and specialist counts than of dentist 
counts. In fact, in some countries (like Denmark and the Netherlands) there is no over-dispersion at all 
in dentist counts. 
In order to gather a better picture of the differences across countries Figure 1 shows the 
histogram of visits to the GPs (first row), specialists (second row) and dentists (third row) by sex (male 
on the left) and country. Notorious differences are detected by country, sex and kind of physician. 
Several reasons can be behind these figures. First, there seems to be a strong relationship between visits 
to the GP or to the dentist and per capita income, since individuals do visit the GP or the dentist 
substantially less frequently in Southern countries and Ireland. Second, the pattern for visits to the 
specialist is less clear and differences may respond to accessibility criteria, which varies from country 
to country. And third, the differences by sex are more evident in the case of visits to specialists than in 
other cases. 
Theoretical issues 
We assume that medical care (measured by the number of visits) is purchased and used as an input in 
the household production function of health closely following Grossman's model. The demand of 
medical services is in this context a derived demand, because services are not consumed per se but to 
maintain or improve upon a certain health status. The patient perceives the marginal product of the 
different medical services in order to take her decisions about contacting different physicians. In 
general, the consumer (the patient) decides whether to visit a physician by comparing the marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of improving her health. The duration of the treatment would be decided on 
a second stage by both the patient and more importantly the physician. 
The visits to a GP or to a dentist are perfectly described by this simple decision process, 
although probably this is not the case of visits to the specialist. While a visit to the GP is also a 
compulsory step for visiting a specialist (both being normally covered by the National Insurance 
systems), a visit to the dentist is uniquely the result of the cost-benefit analysis since most dentist's 
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treatments are not covered by the National Insurance system. At a second stage, the GP decides upon a 
possible visit to a specialist and the specialist decides at a third stage the number of visits. No attempt to 
model this type of complex and interrelated process has been made in this paper given the data we use. 
Moreover, in all the paper we assume that the individual only suffers an illness spell during the period 
covered by the survey which seems to be an important assumption concerning the econometric models 
(see Santos-Silva and Windmeijer [7]). 
The lack of information in the survey does not allow to estimate a full structural model. On the 
contrary, we assume a reduced form as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
where I:it = J (Ikit > 0) is the binary index used for the first decision (latent variable) with J (A) 
indicating the occurrence of event A. Y *kit is the number of visits to physician k (k = GP, specialist and 
dentist). Finally, Xk and Zk are conditionings of both dependent variables that can have common 
elements and Eh E2 are error terms. 
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION PROCESS 
Suppose that we have a sample of Nk observations on (y *ki' Wk;) where k = GP, specialist and dentist and 
we omit the sub-index t for simplicity. The vector of covariates Wki includes variables both in Xk and Zk 
that, following Winkelman [12], may be disjoint or overlapping. We also assume that y*ki = 0 for NkO 
observations and Y*ki > 0 for N k+ and Nk = NkO + N k+. We are interested in explaining the conditional 
expectation of the number of visits to physician k by individual i, Y *ki' given the covariates. In the two-
part model, this expectation can be decomposed in two terms, the probability of observing a positive 
(part one or first hurdle) times the conditional expectation of Y *ki given that it is positive (part two or 
second hurdle). 
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The two-part model decomposes this conditional expected value in two parametric models. The 
first component is usually estimated assuming a discrete choice model (probit or logit). The second 
component can be seen as a count data model. The most common specification for the count model is 
the Poisson regression. However, an undesired feature of the model is the equality of mean and variance 
conditional on the explanatory variables. This equi-dispersion property generally appears as restrictive 
in empirical applications. A Negative Binomial (negbin from now on) model could be assumed for the 
data generating process to overcome the previous assumption (see Hausman et aI., [13]). The variable 
of interest Y:
i 
takes on only non-negative integers (number of visits) or assumes 1 (/:i > 0) when a 
patient decides to visit a physician (or a physician namely a GP decides the visit of a patient to an 
* specialist). Under these circumstances, if Y ki follows a Poisson distribution with mean Ab we can write 
the probability of Yk visits of patient i to physician k as: 
Yk = 0,1,2, ... (3) 
where Ak = E(y:J X ki ,c2k;) = exp(Xk;' [3 +c2ki), where c2ki represents unobserved heterogeneity 
and is uncorrelated with the Xk's by assumption. 
On the other hand, the negbin can be written as a compound of a Poisson and Gamma 
distributions. If we specify Ak as a Gamma distribution and make the integration over Ak, we obtain a 
Negbin for Y *ki (see Cameron and Trivedi [14], for details). 
(4) 
being r a Gamma distribution with parameters Yk and Vk. The moments of the resulting negative 
binomial are: 
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(5) 
where we must understand E(.) and Var(.) as conditional on covariates. Since ek > 0, the distribution 
derived in this way allows for over-dispersion. Moreover, Vk permits to introduce a stochastic error term 
that captures unobserved heterogeneity and possible measurement errors. Finally, we could include 
conditioning variables through eh Vk or both. In fact modelling in different ways the variance in (5) 
yields different negbin models. We will present only results for the negbin 2 in the terminology of 
Cameron and Trivedi [14]. In these specifications, we also model the parameter IIVk with some of the 
conditionings and this cannot be done in the Poisson specifications. 
However, the behaviour of the individuals regarding demand for health services, at least in the 
light of the simple description made in the previous section, seems to follow a double decision process: 
one in which an individual decides to go to the practitioner and another one in which the practitioner 
has the decision to determine the length of the treatment. The patient is also competent in this second 
stage for many reasons: i) a visit to a GP, for instance, could have the solely purpose of obtaining 
information in order to know the specialist she needs to go; ii) although the GP has, at least in some 
countries, the faculty to send patients to the specialist, an individual can decide not to go; iii) the patient 
can decide the number of visits independently of the opinion of the physician (detecting or not induced 
demand). 
From an econometric viewpoint is very important to note that the results provided by previous 
models are correct only when the process governing the discrete part of the model (the zero 
observations) is the same as the process that describes the positive counts. But, even when the same 
determinants appear as important in the two parts of the decision process, their effects and 
interpretations could be different. The econometric specification we are going to use closely follows the 
hurdle models for count data proposed by Mullahy [15], also used by Pohlmeier and Ulrich [2]. Unlike 
Mullahy, we assume that the underlying distribution for the first stage is normal and we model that 
decision by a probit. A Poisson or negative binomial distribution governs the second stage. If we denote 
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likelihood function can be written as: 
II[p(Y:i /X~J3k2,(J;2)] (6) 
ieNk 
where the first two products in (6) govern the binary outcome and the third the number of visits once 
the first decision has been taken. This specification, the Zero Inflated Model (see Mullahy [15] or 
Cameron and Trivedi [14]), allows for zero counts once the initial decision to contact a practitioner has 
been taken. The restriction of absence of zeros in the second stage can be introduced in (6) by using a 
truncated distribution for the second process. The likelihood for this model can be written as: 
(7) 
While in model (6) we allow for the existence of zero visits at the second hurdle, in model (7) 
the second hurdle is governed by a truncated negative binomial (or Poisson) distribution. Given the 
nature of the data that we have, specification (6) is not reasonable since we know that a patient decided 
to contact a physician just when she makes a visit. Therefore, the count for those that decide to visit a 
physician in the first stage is always at least one. Alternatively Deb and Trevedi, [16] and [17], propose 
the use of latent class models instead of two part models in estimating the demand for medical care. 
However in our case we follow a simpler approach and estimate equation (7) by maximum likelihood. 
The first part is estimated by a probit model and therefore we impose the restriction of unit variance for 
the identification of the /3kl vector of parameters (or we identify the ratio /3k/crkh say). 
The likelihood in (7) has been expressed as the product of two parametric ally independent 
likelihood functions. The errors of the two parts of the model can be assumed to be correlated although 
this would imply the use of a different method of estimation (Simulated Method of Moments, as for 
instance Winkelman[12]). 
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Our parameter estimates are useful for comparative purposes although it is worth to mention 
that in general, they are not adequate to calculate elasticities (see Mullahy [10]). This relates to the 
functional form of equations (1) and (2), how unobservable terms enter them, the necessary 
transformations to estimate the parameters of interest and the necessary retransformation to recover 
E(Yki /Wki). To solve that, Mullahy proposes two alternatives. One is the smearing estimator, a two-step 
estimator of the two-part model, in which the parameters of part one are estimated in a discrete choice 
model and the parameters of the expected value conditional on positive counts is estimated by non-
linear least squares in the second step. The second alternative is to estimate the full model in one step 
without recourse to transformation and retransformation, using the adequate identification restrictions 
(see for details Mullahy [10]). 
In our empirical analysis we estimate Poisson, negative binomial and hurdle models using 
country specific and pooled data from the ECHP waves 1 to 3. For each unit of analysis we pool data 
from waves 2 and 3 and we use the remaining wave in order to be able to use predetermined 
information for some key variables. In more detail, our specification considers five groups of variables: 
a) Individual and family demographics b) Labour force status and job characteristics c) Health related 
variables d) Income variables and e) Health coverage controls. Among the first group (individual and 
family demographics) none of the variables is lagged, except for the condition of being the head of the 
household which is related to income. All the job and income related variables are lagged, since they 
may be endogenous to the health condition and, hence, the decision to contact a physician. 
We use a set of health variables (as described in the Appendix) that act as proxies of the 
individual overall health. This makes maximal use of the available information on health status (see 
Anderson y Burkhauser [18] for details about measures and problems of health variables). In order to 
minimise the possible endogeneity of the health variables, they refer to the previous year. However 
there is a notorious exception, since it not possible to have a lagged indicator of the chronic condition 
because of it was not asked for in the first wave of the survey. This does not cause major problems 
(except through persistent individual heterogeneity) since the chronic conditions today and yesterday 
are practically collinear. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Model selection 
The negative binomial hurdle equations for visits to the GP, the specialist and the dentist are estimated 
by maximum likelihood as well as the nested models (Poisson, negbin and hurdle Poisson models). The 
estimation is carried out separately for males and females since differences in behaviour regarding 
health demand can be expected according to sex. In particular, differences on the visits to the specialist 
related to fertility can emerge. 
Table 2 presents the likelihood ratio tests for all the nested models versus our preferred negbin 
hurdle specification. The tests of the Poisson versus the negbin model (with or without hurdle) are 
carried out using a LR statistic, to test the null hypothesis of ak = 0, where ak = J/Vk from equation (5) 
in previous section. We clearly reject the null hypothesis in all cases. This is usually a proof of 
overdispersion (see for instance Cameron and Trivedi [19]), but it could also be a problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity or measurement errors as captured by Ilvk .. 
We also reject simpler models (Poisson or negbin) against the alternative of more complex 
hurdle models. Under the null hypothesis that the two processes underlying the negbin (Poisson) hurdle 
model are identical, then the likelihood reduces to one of the conventional negative binomial (Poisson) 
count data model (see Mullahy [14]). A Wald test is therefore valid to select one model against the 
other. The high X2 values obtained for all specifications reveal that the contact and the frequency 
decision come from different models and have to be separately modelled. Mixing up both decision 
stages within one regression equation leads to inconsistent estimates. The constrained negbin, Poisson 
and hurdle Poisson estimates are available from the authors on request. 
Hurdle negative binomial estimates 
Turning to the estimates, we first discuss the results for males contained in Table 3. For the three 
relevant equations, the first stage represents the contact decision, while the second stage models the 
frequency decision. According to the specification test, the hurdle estimation points to important 
differences between the two decision making stages. In general, the estimates for the first stage are 
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more precisely determined. This result is not surprising since most of the variables used in the analysis 
refer to characteristics of the individual seeking health care. Variables relating the supply of health 
services and that could explain the frequency of the visits are unfortunately not available in this study. 
For the GP equation, age shows a convex relationship in both stages: the probability of a 
contact with the GP as well as the frequency of the consultation afterwards tend to decrease with age to 
a minimum (age 14 for the contacts and age 32 for the duration) after which the relationship becomes 
strictly positive. This result has also been found by Cameron et at [21] or Pohlmeier and Ulrich [2] 
using Australian and German data, respectively. For the specialist equation, the convex effect is only 
seen on the first stage, where the minimum probability of making a contact with the specialist is 
reached when the individual is 30 years old. For visits to the dentist however the pattern reverses: we 
find a quite reasonably concave effect of age on the probability of consulting a dentist and less 
important on the number of visits. It is probably at sooner ages when contacts to dentists are more 
frequent. 
With respect to other demographic characteristics, being married tends to increase the first 
contact with any type of doctor, GP, specialist or dentist. Being separated has the same effect as being 
married on visits to the GP and to the specialist, although it reduces the probability of contacting a 
dentist. Household size works as a disincentive for visiting any type of doctor, a kind of diseconomies 
of scale. Not being from the country slightly reduces the length of the treatment with any doctor, 
specially dentists, which is probably capturing an income effect or a poorer knowledge of foreigner 
health systems. 
Education may eventually correlate with medical knowledge, so that a higher educated person 
tends to favour specialists over general practitioners. On the other hand, people with higher education 
can improve their health more efficiently and therefore contact a GP less often (see Wagstaff [21] and 
Pohlmeier and Ulrich [2] for a discussion on the effect of education). In that case the substitution effect 
should not be present. We find a clear negative effect of education on the decision of contacting a GP 
and on the length of the treatment. At the same time, the decision of contacting a specialist or a dentist 
is positively affected by education while the duration of the treatment, once the contact is made, is 
shorter for these more educated individuals. This finding supports a combination of both theories. 
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Although there is some substitution going on between GPs and specialists, it seems that highly educated 
individuals have a higher marginal product of health and therefore not only contact less the GP but have 
shorter treatments. Occupational dummies reinforce the effect of education: the" more skille~ the 
individual is the higher the probability that he contacts a specialist or a dentist. Again, the frequency of 
the treatment is slightly shorter for this group of individuals. These variables can also be reflecting the 
opportunity cost of visiting a physician, measured as the cost of losing hours of work (for instance, low 
for workers belonging to the public sector and high for self-employed). 
Job status variables are expected to measure the opportunity cost of visiting the doctor, once 
we control by income. In this direction, self-employment and unemployment reduce the probability of 
establishing a contact with any type of physician (the comparison group is inactivity). Employment has 
a less clear effect: it reduces the duration of the treatment for any type of consultation but it only has a 
negative effect on the probability of contacting a specialist. Furthermore its effect on the decision to 
contact a dentist is positive. In order to better interpret these results, we should have information about 
the characteristics of the job (risks, dangers, etc.). However, the effect of job risk is insignificant in the 
GP and specialist equations, or it could be hidden in the occupational variables. Given that only basic 
dentist services are covered in most countries by the Public Health System, this positive effect could be 
associated to an income or potential income effect. Other job characteristics are of little relevance in 
explaining the dependent variables. 
Of special interest is the effect of the variable of income which is introduced with a quadratic 
term. This variable could have two opposing effects: on the one hand it could reinforce the effect of the 
educational and occupational variables being also correlated with medical knowledge. In that case we 
will expect a negative effect of income on the probability of contacting a GP. On the other hand it could 
reflect the willingness to pay for health services. Then it could have a positive effect on the probability 
of contacting the specialist or the dentist, that could be accessed via private consultation and payment. 
In this way the individual will skip the normal public system procedure in most countries that forces 
patients to go first to the GP in order to get to the specialist. We do not find any effect of income on the 
probability of contacting a GP although the variable reduces the length of the visits, reinforcing the 
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educational effect. As expected from the discussion above, income affects the decision of contacting a 
specialist or a dentist in a concave way. 
Not surprisingly, health during the previous year is a major determinant of current demand for 
health. Self-perceived good health reduces the probability of contacting any type of doctor (apart from 
the visits to the dentist which are less related to the overall individual health situation) and also reduces 
the length of the treatment. To suffer a chronic illness or have been admitted as in-patient at a hospital 
during previous year increase both the probability of contacts and the length of the treatments for the 
three type of visits. As a measure of incapacity, the dummy that reflects whether the individual is 
hampered in his daily activities has a positive effect on the contact probability and duration of treatment 
for both visits to the GP and to the specialist. However it has a negative effect on the probability of 
contacting a dentist and the length of the resulting treatment. That could just be reflecting the 
difficulties of these individuals to get to the dentist. 
The type of public health system in the country has its own effect (Table 5 states the type of 
system for each country).We consider three types of National Insurance systems (NIS): Beveridge 
(universal coverage, financed by taxes, public property and control), Bismarkian (universal and 
compulsory coverage, financed by individual and employer contributions, private property) or mixed 
(that is, a combination of the previous systems). Notice that is not very easy to fit the countries' NIS 
into these three groups, since the specific systems tend to combine characteristics of the pure types. 
Individuals in countries with a Beveridge type NIS tend to contact less any type of doctor and once a 
contact is made the length of the visits to the GP and the specialist is smaller. The probability of 
contacting a dentist his higher although the length of the visits is shorter in these countries than in the 
reference group (mixed systems). Individuals in countries with a Bismarkian type National Insurance 
System 0 show a lower probability of visiting the GP. The probability of contacting a specialist is also 
lower although the duration of the treatment is longer. Finally to contact a dentist is more probable. 
Therefore it seems that the Beveridge model of public health implies a more rational use of the 
resources than the mixed or Bismark systems that incentive longer treatments with specialists. The 
country dummies have a strong effect reflecting differences in the health system not picked up by the 
previous variables. 
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Finally, the dummy variable that equals one if the individual is covered by private insurance has 
a positive effect on the contact stage of the visits to the specialist and dentist, as expected. We must note 
that this variable can not be identified for the countries with a Bismarkian health system since the 
ECHP does not give a detailed description of the type of insurance and all individuals are assumed to be 
privately insured. Private patients can choose their GP and specialists freely, so that it is not 
compulsory to visit the GP in order to get an appointment with an specialist. The variable also reduces 
the treatment with the GP and increases the treatment with the specialist. This evidence gives some 
support to the hypothesis of a supplier-induced demand (Pohlmeier and Ulrich [2] find similar evidence 
for Germany). 
The maximum likelihood estimates for females appear in Table 4. In general, the direction of 
the results is similar than for males. However some differences emerge that are worth to mention. First 
the convex age effect for the contacts with the GP and the specialist is stronger. The probability of 
contacting a GP reach a minimum at 37 while the probability of contacting a specialist decreases for all 
the relevant age range. With respect to the second stage, both the duration of the visits to the GP and to 
the specialist show a less clear convex relationship. The behaviour relating dentist is similar for both 
males and females. 
An important difference between males and females is the clear positive and strong effect of 
marriage (and divorce/widowhood) on the female contacts and length of the treatment of visits to the 
GP and specialist. This positive relationship just reflect the fact that a considerable amount of the visits 
to the doctor of married women are related with fertility issues. The absence of any effect of marital 
status on the visits to the dentist just corroborates the previous hypothesis. 
Education and income play for females a better defined effect: they reduce the probability and 
length of the visits to the GP and increase the probability and length of the visits to the specialist. 
Therefore, better informed females (higher educated or with higher income) tend to substitute the visits 
to the GP by the visits to the specialist. Finally, the highly significant and positive effect of holding a 
private insurance on the length of dentists' and specialists' treatments strongly supports the hypothesis 
of a supplier induced demand. Finally, health related variables have almost the same effects both in 
males and females. 
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Differences across countries 
The analysis presented in previous section is made on the basis that the differences across countries are 
differences on the constant or that can be summarised by the variables reflecting the type of insurance 
system they have. Although a formal test is not carried out in this section we try to provide some 
evidence with respect to the differences across countries. We estimate the hurdle negbin model for each 
country and we then present in Table 5 a summary of the main differences across countries of the effect 
of three of the most relevant variables, namely, age and income that allow for a quadratic effect, and the 
dummy reflecting whether the individual is privately insured. As it can be seen there is some variation 
across countries although the precision is low in several of them. 
We find some interesting regularities across the EU. For example, in most of the countries age 
and income have a concave (or at least linear positive) effect on the probability of contacting a dentist, 
specially for females, while these variables have a negligible effect on the frequency of the visits to the 
dentist (for males and females). Also the positive effect of the dummy of private insurance on the 
decision of visiting a specialist or a dentist is quite general. Finally, the behaviour with respect to the 
specialist which seems to follow a common pattern across the European countries considered here. 
Figures 2 and 3 show a more detailed description of the age and income effects. They present 
either access probabilities or expected number of visits by country, sex and age or income, respectively. 
Both figures are constructed on the basis of a common reference person with the following 
characteristics: head of the family, living in a household with two other persons, full-time employed in 
an industrial blue collar occupation and declaring having good health, not married, not having any 
private insurance and either having the country average age or average income (depending on the 
graph). Although the differences across countries in age and income effects are evident, some 
regularities among Mediterranean (Italy, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extend Greece) and among 
Northern countries are found. For example, is worth mentioning that individuals in Mediterranean 
countries have lower probability of visiting any type of doctor. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper estimates a demand for health equation using three waves of data from the European 
Community Household Panel on the basis of a typical specification of Grossman's [1] theoretical 
proposal. Three different measures of health services are analysed, namely visits to the GP, visits to the 
specialist and visits to the dentist. A hurdle negative binomial model proves to be the one that best 
adjusts to the data from 12 European countries. The particularity of such model is that it allows for two 
different processes underlying the demand for health: one that drives the decision of contacting a 
physician and another that drives the duration of the treatment with the physician. 
Our results clearly support the hypothesis that contact and frequency decisions for GPs, 
specialists and dentists are governed by different stochastic processes and need to be modelled 
separately. We find some evidence of supplier induced demand of specialists and dentist services, 
which they are not publicly provided in some countries. 
Behavioural differences between male and female are not really big and they are only important 
with respect to the probability of contacting specialists and the number of visits. This is related to the 
need of visiting this type of practitioners because of fertility reasons. We have considered five types of 
covariates namely individual and family demographics, labour force status and job characteristics, 
health related variables, income variables and health coverage controls. We find the expected results for 
most of these conditionings. It is worth to mention that income has no effect on the decision to contact a 
GP, both in the females and males models, since health services by GPs are publicly provided in all 
countries. Health related variables have almost the same expected effects both in males and females. 
Good health condition reduces both the probability of contacts and the frequency while bad health 
conditions increases both probabilities. On the other hand, the coverage by private insurance increases 
the probability of a contact and the number of contacts to specialists and dentists, both for males and 
females. 
Although we do not provide formal tests, we show that differences across countries, although 
existent are not specially relevant. This allows us to formulate a joint model for the 12 countries 
considered. To some extent, we can mention that two groups of countries can be considered in the 
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decision to contact physicians (mainly specialist and dentists) as regards income and age, mediterranean 
countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extend, Greece) and northern ones. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of visits counts by sex and country. 
PRACTICIONER SPECIALIST DENTIST 
Country female male female male female male 
% 0.784 0.737 0.706 0.460 0.857 0.793 
Germany mean 4.457 3.644 3.618 2.269 2.348 1.911 
st-dev 7.586 7.190 6.972 5.827 3.095 2.514 
% 0.793 0.632 0.308 0.236 0.874 0.825 
Denmark mean 3.287 1.936 1.040 0.679 1.977 1.744 
st-dev 5.139 3.772 2.978 2.299 1.962 1.594 
% 0.756 0.626 0.385 0.300 0.844 0.798 
Nether. mean 3.149 1.897 1.903 1.170 1.905 1.718 
st-dev 4.657 3.633 5.054 3.460 1.693 1.612 
% 0.839 0.786 0.604 0.371 0.650 0.575 
Belgium mean 4.368 3.314 2.282 1.301 1.703 1.400 
st-dev 6.311 5.483 4.295 3.446 2.770 2.363 
% 0.807 0.757 0.769 0.436 0.789 0.702 
luxem. mean 3.155 2.539 2.712 1.496 1.922 1.658 
st-dev 3.610 3.752 4.137 3.370 3.064 3.034 
% 0.831 0.697 0.358 0.299 0.723 0.615 
U.K. mean 4.217 2.554 l.l46 0.934 1.706 1.401 
st-dev 5.534 4.326 3.169 2.756 1.918 1.764 
% 0.737 0.575 0.230 0.170 0.397 0.342 
Ireland mean 3.617 2.259 0.771 0.460 0.855 0.682 
st-dev 5.985 4.898 2.331 1.897 1.765 1.400 
% 0.757 0.639 0.412 0.255 0.385 0.332 
Italy mean 3.851 2.648 1.296 0.777 1.284 0.997 
st-dev 5.915 4.940 3.084 2.672 3.116 2.599 
% 0.470 0.382 0.380 0.240 0.301 0.252 
Greece mean 1.676 l.l95 1.501 1.023 0.915 0.729 
st-dev 3.311 2.554 3.342 3.499 2.365 2.047 
% 0.661 0.551 0.461 0.305 0.341 0.284 
Spain mean 3.681 2.354 1.792 1.141 1.012 0.755 
st-dev 6.804 5.306 4.081 3.635 2.652 2.120 
% 0.667 0.518 0.393 0.223 0.268 0.203 
Portugal mean 3.172 1.888 1.349 0.714 0.722 0.501 
st-dev 4.784 3.201 3.117 2.234 1.749 1.418 
% 0.887 0.846 0.836 0.584 0.817 0.768 
Austria mean 4.611 3.707 2.911 2.060 2.110 1.768 
st-dev 7.299 5.965 5.532 4.919 2.727 2.481 
Note. % means percentage of positive observations 
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Table 2: Specification Tests for the EV12 specification. 
Null Alternati ve Distrib. GP Specialist Dentist 
Males 
Poisson Negbin LR: X(I) 1.26x105 1.12x105 46299.06 
Poisson Hurdle Poisson W: X(36) 3371.7 2046.5 15553.5 
Negbin Hurdle Negbin W: X(36) 2409.7 564.6 8248.9 
Hurdle Poisson Hurdle Negbin LR:X(1) 36362.93 24099.97 7169.05 
Females 
Poisson Negbin LR: x(l) 1.62x105 1.43xl05 62135.37 
Poisson Hurdle Poisson W: X(36) 2828.4 4260.2 19025.9 
Ncgbin Hurdle Negbin W: X(36) 1938.9 2003.9 10606.9 
Hurdle Poisson Hurdle Negbin LR: x(l) 53771.7 36100.26 15704.94 
Notes: LR: Likelihood ratio test; W: Wald test. 
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Table 3. Negative Binomial Distributed Hurdle Model for Males 
Visits to the GP Visits to the Specialist Visits to the Dentist 
1 st Stage 2nd Stage 1 st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Age -0.0254 -8.020 -0.0056 -1.409 -0.0178 -5.292 0.0070 0.875 0.0047 1.419 -0.0047 -0.877 
Age Squared 0.0004 10.145 0.0002 4.362 0.0003 6.540 -0.0001 -1.061 -0.0001 -3.980 0.0001 1.544 
Head ofHH 0.0256 1.764 0.0342 1.965 0.0062 0.410 -0.0161 -0.473 -0.0034 -0.232 -0.0063 -0.277 
Married 0.1873 12.001 -0.0319 -1.545 0.1271 7.529 -0.0312 -0.740 0.0858 5.278 -0.0054 -0.206 
Separated 0.0892 2.816 0.0324 0.856 0.0617 1.901 0.1229 1.649 -0.0778 -2.422 0.0574 1.140 
HH size -0.0229 -6.314 0.0127 2.653 -0.0349 -8.802 -0.0167 -1.737 -0.0487 -12.763 -0.0021 -0.339 
Not National -0.0083 -0.242 -0.0585 -1.494 -0.0325 -0.958 -0.0960 -1.258 0.1638 4.934 -0.1043 -2.105 
High School -0.0565 -3.822 -0.1386 -7.137 0.0251 1.628 -0.0612 -1.720 0.1446 9.485 -0.0432 -1.998 
Employed 0.0049 0.218 -0.1702 -6.646 -0.0393 -1.758 -0.0993 -2.054 0.1100 4.899 -0.0915 -2.464 
Self-employed -0.1266 -7.865 -0.0099 -0.453 -0.1106 -6.324 -0.0591 -1.356 -0.1164 -6.941 -0.0127 -0.454 
Unemployed -0.0618 -2.465 -0.0238 -0.828 -0.1120 -4.406 0.0197 0.345 -0.0473 -1.871 -0.0132 -0.301 
Part Time -0.0301 -0.937 -0.0025 -0.058 -0.0600 -1.726 0.0374 0.431 -0.0597 -1.799 0.0333 0.611 
Professional 0.0001 0.008 -0.0854 -4.521 0.0949 6.230 -0.0517 -1.430 0.1750 11.735 -0.0224 -1.008 
Clerical 0.0765 3.706 -0.0501 -1.932 0.1023 4.766 -0.0403 -0.790 0.1591 7.661 0.0118 0.371 
Services 0.0217 1.061 -0.0533 -1.923 0.0489 2.193 -0.0678 -1.221 0.0914 4.304 0.0251 0.716 
Public Sector 0.0383 2.677 0.0675 3.703 0.0797 5.349 0.0088 0.250 0.0713 4.818 0.0241 1.106 
Not supervisory job 0.0185 1.533 0.0322 2.049 -0.0459 -3.587 0.0302 0.980 -0.0816 -6.530 0.0128 0.682 
Job risk -0.0010 -0.351 -0.0129 -3.322 -0.0002 -0.072 -0.0022 -0.280 -0.0007 -0.222 0.0052 1.088 
HH Income -0.0006 -0.011 -0.1974 -3.005 0.5852 9.181 -0.0215 -0.128 0.9936 19.255 0.0610 0.795 
HH Income Squared -0.0027 -0.096 0.0501 1.321 -0.2465 -5.053 0.0594 0.410 -0.2741 -9.350 -0.0164 -0.439 
Good Health -0.2593 -18.556 -0.3589 -22.216 -0.2482 -17.785 -0.3016 -9.687 0.0306 2.167 -0.1320 -5.694 
Chronic illness 0.4358 26.747 0.7688 46.455 0.7367 48.663 0.7873 26.587 0.0446 2.774 0.1665 6.864 
Hampered 0.1214 6.595 0.2492 13.050 0.1320 7.579 0.1770 5.038 -0.0432 -2.376 -0.0327 -1.144 
At Hospital 0.2114 10.172 0.3244 15.446 0.4496 23.341 0.4384 11.967 0.0297 1.499 0.0694 2.289 
SS Bismark model -0.2400 -8.219 -0.0076 -0.237 -0.3263 -9.484 0.5213 8.195 0.7659 27.209 -0.0405 -1.006 
SS Beveridge model -0.3530 -11.616 -0.5179 -15.044 -0.8480 -23.075 -0.3780 -5.178 0.2106 7.395 -0.1336 -3.112 
Private Insurance 0.0200 1.439 -0.0398 -2.176 0.1161 7.838 0.0696 1.945 0.1410 9.920 0.0283 1.204 
Denmark -0.1526 -5.288 -0.0336 -0.915 -0.1278 -4.152 0.0863 1.117 0.6292 20.442 -0.1262 -3.213 
Netherlands -0.2786 -12.004 -0.5759 -20.280 -0.3863 -16.596 -0.3124 -6.011 0.0293 1.173 -0.1643 -5.590 
Belgium --- --- --- --- -0.5580 -15.012 0.0703 0.971 --- --- --- ---
Luxembourg 0.0937 2.302 -0.4248 -9.356 -0.0896 -2.331 -0.5761 -7.154 -0.3316 -8.302 -0.0560 -1.075 
Ireland -0.5355 -19.119 -0.2852 -8.662 -1.0868 -29.687 -0.4790 -6.066 -0.4484 -16.865 -0.3554 -7.736 
Italy -0.4120 -15.588 -0.1617 -5.445 -0.7175 -21.763 -0.1124 -1.772 -0.3718 -15.000 0.3497 8.791 
Greece -1.0763 -38.288 -0.5832 -16.023 -0.7390 -21.136 0.2926 4.191 -0.5934 -21.987 0.3210 6.907 
Spain -0.6697 -26.218 -0.2263 -7.814 -0.6550 -19.278 0.0781 1.189 -0.5734 -23.882 0.1320 3.295 
Portugal -0.7977 -28.241 -0.4889 -14.484 -0.8804 -25.100 -0.2230 -3.169 -0.7081 -25.671 0.0224 0.452 
Austria 0.2052 5.159 -0.1172 -3.047 --- --- --- --- 0.6729 18.320 -0.1173 -2.406 
Intercept 1.2340 16.896 1.1642 12.949 0.3443 4.340 -0.2346 -1.218 -0.3526 -4.780 0.3931 3.293 
Ln(Alfa) 0.3103 15.200 1.8200 21.779 0.5182 14.661 
Log Likelihood -145,860.25 -86,507.34 -102,294.94 
N. observations 78,238 77,704 78,076 
Note. Onutted country dumnues for Germany, UK and Austna 
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Table 4. Negative Binomial Distributed Hurdle Model for Females 
Visits to the GP Visits to the Specialist Visits to the Dentist 
1 SI Stage 2nd Stage 1 SI Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Age -0.0147 -4.709 -0.0299 -9.958 -0.0004 -0.148 -0.0445 -8.258 0.0292 9.505 0.0079 1.717 
Age Squared 0.0002 5.712 0.0004 10.562 -0.0001 -1.887 0.0003 4.844 -0.0005 -13.675 -0.0001 -1.655 
Head ofHH 0.0255 1.637 0.0240 1.658 0.0323 2.190 0.1023 3.981 0.0124 0.803 0.0486 2.278 
Married 0.2113 12.778 0.2176 13.147 0.3537 21.995 0.4082 14.029 -0.0128 -0.772 -0.0224 -0.938 
Separated 0.1808 7.404 0.2231 9.930 0.2725 11.929 0.2879 7.265 -0.0165 -0.691 0.0275 0.803 
HH size -0.0328 -8.510 -0.0112 -2.917 -0.0748 -19.634 -0.0966 -14.265 -0.0433 -11.157 -0.0126 -2.089 
Not National 0.0741 2.137 -0.0912 -2.852 0.0096 0.290 -0.1328 -2.555 0.1421 4.257 0.0379 0.848 
High School -0.0965 -6.045 -0.1477 -8.761 0.0661 4.272 0.0623 2.311 0.1510 9.206 -0.0645 -3.081 
Employed 0.0191 1.128 -0.0683 -4.069 0.0098 0.601 -0.0865 -2.874 0.0730 4.350 0.0036 0.147 
Self-employed -0.0348 -1.412 -0.0079 -0.313 -0.0989 -4.142 0.0311 0.703 -0.0793 -3.199 0.0203 0.542 
Unemployed -0.0029 -0.148 0.0067 0.347 -0.0357 -1.885 -0.0660 -1.872 -0.0332 -1.709 0.0643 2.227 
Part Time -0.0487 -2.683 -0.0378 -2.132 -0.0274 -1.583 -0.0181 -0.593 0.0287 1.544 -0.0126 -0.532 
Professional -0.0588 -3.027 -0.0696 -3.555 0.1529 8.197 0.0176 0.534 0.2018 10.173 0.0145 0.561 
Clerical -0.0001 -0.003 -0.0618 -3.104 0.1316 6.783 -0.0588 -1.712 0.2429 11.842 -0.0395 -1.483 
Services 0.0006 0.030 -0.0335 -1.760 0.0502 2.697 -0.0048 -0.140 0.1015 5.259 0.0034 0.127 
Public Sector 0.0278 1.595 0.0198 1.153 0.0563 3.399 0.0579 1.999 0.0579 3.235 -0.0019 -0.086 
Not supervisory job 0.0616 3.965 0.0478 3.081 -0.0083 -0.556 0.0461 1.715 -0.0501 -3.168 0.0329 1.594 
Job risk -0.0024 -0.655 -0.0036 -0.988 -0.0055 -1.540 0.0077 1.209 -0.0106 -2.805 -0.0061 -1.226 
HH Income -0.0474 -0.861 -0.4439 -7.769 0.8717 15.567 0.2748 3.100 1.1282 20.827 -0.0735 -0.957 
HH Income Squared 0.0151 0.401 0.1612 3.930 -0.3188 -7.588 -0.1087 -2.048 -0.3756 -10.232 -0.0341 -0.683 
Good Health -0.3306 -23.676 -0.4342 -35.539 -0.1892 -14.968 -0.3809 -17.364 0.0312 2.369 -0.1276 -6.498 
Chronic illness 0.4090 24.05 0.6564 51.170 0.6580 44.953 0.7353 32.803 0.0348 2.245 0.1450 6.760 
Hampered 0.0993 5.389 0.1981 13.859 0.1199 7.521 0.2022 8.048 -0.0757 -4.488 0.0134 0.552 
At Hospital 0.1700 8.675 0.2749 17.741 0.3537 20.502 0.3995 15.502 0.0133 0.743 0.0414 1.695 
SS Bismark model -0.5121 -13.209 0.0652 2.229 -0.5126 -14.273 0.5081 11.730 0.2039 5.576 0.0886 2.282 
SS Beveridge model -0.3112 -7.687 -0.0606 -1.999 -1.5487 -41.948 -0.3963 -7.587 -0.3512 -9.631 -0.1695 -4.088 
Private Insurance -0.0349 -2.376 -0.0136 -0.944 0.1089 7.737 0.0927 3.581 0.2061 14.347 0.0893 4.130 
Denmark -0.1406 -4.508 -0.1904 -6.959 -0.1779 -6.286 0.2078 3.504 0.5174 15.943 -0.1012 -2.862 
Netherlands -0.0575 -2.433 -0.3577 -16.268 -0.8586 -38.407 -0.1609 -4.317 -0.0372 -1.416 -0.3248 -12.192 
Belgium -0.1777 -4.231 0.1138 3.577 -0.8235 -21.63 0.0947 1.904 -0.7059 -18.719 -0.0089 -0.199 
Luxembourg 0.1449 3.423 -0.3725 -9.747 0.1616 3.973 -0.5292 -9.713 -0.3339 -7.849 -0.1513 -3.147 
Ireland -0.4895 -12.492 0.0050 0.164 -1.6982 -45.678 -0.0302 -0.530 -1.2082 -33.727 -0.3157 -6.797 
Italy -0.5172 -13.954 0.0016 0.056 -1.0712 -31.405 -0.0322 -0.743 -1.0899 -32.503 0.4136 10.53 
Greece -1.2804 -33.882 -0.4987 -15.648 -1.1401 -32.302 0.3088 6.553 -1.3009 -37.330 0.2969 6.730 
Spain -0.7917 -20.992 -0.0139 -0.474 -1.0204 -29.138 0.2068 4.584 -1.3015 -37.614 0.1856 4.409 
Portugal -0.8913 -23.261 -0.3032 -10.061 -1.182 -33.212 -0.0290 -0.612 -1.3465 -38.163 0.0533 1.163 
Intercept 1.5173 19.933 2.0480 29.078 0.8185 11.349 1.5674 12.722 0.2106 2.857 0.1754 1.695 
Ln(Alfa) 1.1642 12.949 1.1701 30.267 0.5151 17.474 
Log Likelihood -184,180.33 -125,982.26 -120,120.18 
N. observations 82,574 82,424 82,452 
Note. Omitted country dummies for Germany, UK and Austria 
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Table 5. The effect of age, income and private insurance in the 1st and 2nd Stages. 
1 st Stage 2nd Stage 
GP S ecialist Dentist GP S ecialist Dentist 
country system age inc hps age inc hps age inc hps age inc hps age inc hps age inc 
1. Germany Bi CV ns -- CV cc -- CC ns -- CV CC -- ns ns -- ns ns 
2. Denmark Be CV ns L+ cv cc L+ CC CC L+ ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
3. Nether. Bi cv ns -- CV ns -- L- 1+ -- CV ns -- ns ns -- CV ns 
4. Belgium Mix ns ns 1+ ns ns 1+ ns CC ns ns CV ns cv cv ns ns ns 
5. Luxem. Bi CV ns -- ns cc -- ns CC -- CV ns -- ns ns -- ns ns 
6. France 
7. U.K. Be CV ns ns CV cc L+ cc L+ L+ ns ns L- CC cv 1+ ns cc 
8. Ireland Mix CV L+ ns ns cc L+ CC CC L+ CC ns 1- cc ns ns ns ns 
9. Ita~ Mix ns ns I- ns CC L+ ns CC L+ CV cc L- ns ns ns ns ns 
10. Greece Mix ns ns ns ns CC ns ns CC ns L+ ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
11. Spain Mix CV ns ns CV ns L+ ns CC ns CV ns ns ns ns L+ CV ns 
12. Portugal Mix cv L+ L+ cv CC ns ns CC L+ L+ CV ns ns ns ns ns ns 
13. Austria Mix CV ns ns ns ns 1+ ns ns L+ CV CC ns ns ns ns CC CC 
All MALE Mix CV ns ns CV CC L+ CC CC L+ CV L- L- ns ns 1+ ns ns 
1. Germany Bi CV L- -- L- cc -- ns ns -- ns ns -- L- cc -- CC ns 
2. Denmark Be I- ns ns ns CC L+ CC CC L+ CV ns L+ ns CV ns CC ns 
3. Nether. Bi ns ns -- CV CC -- cc L+ -- ns 1- -- ns ns -- CC ns 
4. Belgium Mix CV cc ns ns CC L+ CC CC ns CV ns ns L- ns ns ns ns 
5. Luxem. Bi CV cc -- ns ns -- cc ns -- cv ns -- ns cc -- ns ns 
6. France 
7. U.K. Be ns ns ns ns ns 1+ CC 1+ L+ CV ns ns cc ns L+ ns ns 
8. Ireland Mix CV ns ns ns CC L+ CC CC L+ CV ns L- ns L+ ns ns 1+ 
9. Italy Mix ns ns I- ns CC L+ CC CC L+ CV CV ns CV ns ns ns ns 
10. Greece Mix ns ns ns ns CC ns CC CC 1+ L+ ns ns CV CC ns cv ns 
11. Spain Mix CV L- L- ns CC L+ CC CC L+ CV L- ns CV CC L+ I- ns 
12. Portugal Mix ns CC L+ CC CC ns CC CC 1+ cv L- ns ns L+ ns cv ns 
13. Austria Mix ns CC ns CC ns 1+ CC ns L+ ns CC ns ns ns ns ns ns 
All FEMALE Mix CV ns L- cc CC L+ CC CC L+ CV CV ns CV CC L+ cc ns 
Bi: Bismark model. Be: Beveridge model. Mix: mixture model. 
Notes. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
CC: Concave and significant. CV: Convex and significant. L+:Linear positive. L-: Linear negative. ns: non significant. 
Capital letters denote significance at 5% and small letters denote significance at 10%. 
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Appendix. Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics. 
The variables included in the analysis are grouped in five categories: 
1) personal and household characteristics: 
* marital status: two dummies, one taking value 1 if the individual is married, and the 
other equalling 1 if the individual is separated/divorced/widowed 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a dummy for the individual being head of the household, dated in wave -1. 
age and its square. 
education: a dummy for the individual having a third level of education recognised 
not national: a dummy for individuals not being nationals of the country where they are, 
dated in wave -1. 
household size. 
Household income and its squared, dated in wave -1. 
2) labour force status characteristics: 
* Dummies cont.rolling for self-employment, unemployment, part-time job and, working 
in the public sector, dated in wave -1. 
* 
* 
Occupational dummies: professionals, clerks, services workers, dated in wave -1 
risk at job, dated in wave -1 
3) health related variables: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a dummy if the individual reports himself as having good health, dated in wave -1. 
a dummy for individuals having a chronic physical or mental health problem, current 
(since it was not asked for in the first wave of the survey). 
a dummy if the individual is hampered in daily activities by any physical or mental 
health problem, illness or disability, dated in wave -1. 
a dummy for individual was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous 
year, dated in wave -1 
4) income variables: 
* Household income and its squared (in 10"5 PPP units), dated in wave -1. 
5) country variables: 
* Bismark health system index (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
* 
* 
Beveridge health system index (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 
Private insurance system (only for not Bismarkian system) 
In Table Al we present summary statistics by sex and by sex and country 
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observations. 
visits to GP: observ. 
visits to GP: frequency 
visits to GP: unc. mean 
visits to SP: observ. 
visits to SP: frequency 
visits to SP: uncon. mean 
visits to DT: obs. 
visits to DT: frequency 
visits to DT: unc. mean 
-------------------------
Age 
age-squared 
head of the house 
married 
sep. -di vorced. -widowed 
size of the household 
not-national 
educated (college) 
employed 
self-employed 
unemployed 
part-time 
professional 
clerk 
services employee 
not supervisory job 
household income 
household income sq 
pub. 
Good Health 
Chronic illness 
Hampered 
At Hospital 
risk at job 
Biskmark health system 
Beveridge health system 
Private insurance 
Table A.1. Mean of the variables by sex and country 
male female I 
all I st-d: G I NL I D I B I L I UK I IRL I I I GK I Sp I p I A all I st-d 1 G I NL 1 D1 B I L I UK I IRL I I I GK I Sp I p I A 
80359 --: 7126 3886 6634 4576 1579 5W9 6268 13834 8446 11566 8180 2655 83851 --: 7226 4037 7430 4966 1628 5978 6212 14076 8962 11936 8695 2705 
78238 6923 3881 6632 4471 1573 4745 625413824 817011315 8126 232482574 --: 7090 4031 7426 4874 1617 5522 619914063 8891 11775 8852 2434 
0.609 0.48S: 0.737 0.632 0.626 0786 0.757 0.697 0.575 0.639 0.382 0.551 0.518 0.846 0.720 0.449: 0.784 0.793 0.756 0.839 0.807 0.831 0.737 0.757 0.470 0.661 0.667 0.887 
, 
2.394 4.806: 3.644 1.936 1.897 3.314 2.539 2.554 2.259 2.648 1.195 2.354 1.888 3.707 3.529 5.817: 4.457 3.287 3.149 4.368 3.155 4.217 3.617 3.851 1.676 3.681 3.172 4.611 
77704 --: 6900 3880 6630 43119 1572 4748 624713822 816911313 8128 190682424 --: 7083 4033 7426 4818 1617 5522 619414058 8891 11775 8659 2348 
0.293 0.455: 0.460 O.23G (UOO 0.371 0.436 0.299 0.170 0.255 0.240 0.305 0.223 0.584 0.444 0.497: 0.706 0.308 0.385 0.604 0.769 0.358 0.230 0.412 0.380 0.461 0.393 0.836 
Ul70 3.432; 2.269 0.679 1.170 1.301 1.496 0.934 0.460 0.777 1.023 1.141 0.714 2.06( 1.718 4.130: 3.618 1.040 1.903 2.282 2.712 1.146 0.771 1.296 1.501 1.792 1.349 2.911 
78076 --: 6931 3881 6634 4424 1573 4749 625213822 817011314 8132 219 82452 --: 7110 4034 7430 4S18 1618 5526 6201 14058 8891 11779 8664 2323 
0.460 0.49S: 0.793 0.825 0.798 0.575 0.702 0.615 0.342 0.332 0.252 0.284 0.203 0.76f 0.522 0.500: 0.S57 0.874 0.844 0.650 0.789 0.723 0.397 0.385 0.301 0.341 ·0.268 0.817 
1.119 2.156: 1.911 1.744 1.718 1.400 1.65S 1.401 0.682 0.997 0.729 0.755 0.501 I.7M 1.384 2.539: 2.348 1.977 1.905 1.703 1.922 1.706 0.855 1.284 0.915 1.012 0.722 2.110 
-40.-24- -13.23: 41:i(l -40.5() -4i.i.sl -4().-ii -40.9()- 4-1~26 -38'-86- -39.69 -41:38 -39.-19- -3-9~88 -4().-i3 -46.47- -1\ if 41.ii -4"(l.52 -4ia:4" -40.21 --39~9j -40.-91 -39.48- 39~88 -4O.-9C) -39.82 -4-(4"7 -40.75 
1794 1096: 1909 1795 1808 1769 1826 1859 1696 1755 1896 1722 1783 180~ 1810 1(l93: 1910 1800 1764 1774 1743 1831 1735 1767 1856 1773 1908 1835 
0.675 0.46S: 0.719 0.702 0.869 0.569 0.778 0.776 0.629 0.630 0.715 0.648 0.599 0.507 0.192 0.39~ 0.285 0.428 0.199 0.148 0.195 0.255 0.142 0.126 0.144 0.143 0.177 0.384 
0.681 0.466: 0.741 0.718 0.781 0.737 0.745 0.696 0.598 0.627 0.707 0.631 0.674 0.696 (l.705 0.456: 0.764 0.739 0.776 0.721 0.749 0.713 0.655 0.667 0.728 0.656 0.691 0.712 
0.030 0.171: 0.042 0.062 0.035 0.051 0.046 0.065 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.031 0.081 0.274: 0.087 0.110 0.078 0.114 0.080 0.124 0.066 0.054 0.075 0.071 0.091 0.099 
3.642 1.50~ 3.070 2.790 3.150 3.316 3.380 3.091 4.484 3.801 3.713 4.052 3.968 3.69~ 3.556 1.49~ 2.983 2.809 3.054 3.259 3.340 3.056 4.468 3.732 3.612 3.962 3.801 3.588 
0.976 0.153: 0.963 0.973 0.986 0.911 0.674 0.977 0.985 0.997 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.964 0.976 0.153: 0.966 0.975 0.988 0.930 0.648 0.974 0.982 0.997 0.987 0.993 0.996 0.955 
0.170 0.376: 0.283 0.320 0.210 0.283 0.201 0.261 0.137 0.074 0.182 0.178 0.036 0.063 0.140 0.347: 0.122 0.323 0.153 0.295 0.110 0.211 0.117 0.059 0.171 0.156 0.041 0.065 
0.812 0.39~ 0.849 0.860 0.853 0.811 0.835 0.816 0.820 0.784 0.817 0.739 0.848 0.85C 0.530 0.499: 0.596 0.763 0.511 0.600 0.524 0.629 0.465 0.485 0.456 0.425 0.593 0.611 
0.155 0.362: 0.059 0.072 0.056 0.094 (l.O87 0.142 0.196 0.182 0.321 0.146 0.194 O.IOS 0.054 0.226: 0.025 0.027 0.020 0.045 0.027 0.048 0.025 0.066 0.083 0.051 0.104 0.076 
0.086 0.28~ 0.048 0.081 0.049 0.064 0.014 0.088 0.119 0.109 (l.070 0.149 0.054 0.036 0.083 0.275: 0.059 0.111 0.148 0.101 0.014 0.024 0.039 0.090 0.085 0.116 0.064 0.034 
0.022 0.147: 0.010 0.023 0.028 0.015 0.013 0.029 0.036 0.022 0.033 0.020 0.013 0.01( 0.094 0.292: 0.143 0.124 0.183 0.120 0.122 0.177 0.088 0.059 0.051 0.048 0.053 0.099 
0.233 0.423: 0.328 0.337 0.420 0.286 0.267 0.318 0.224 0.143 0.210 0.168 0.138 0.224 0.160 0.366: 0.261 0.275 0.242 0.245 0.153 0.223 0.140 0.098 0.110 0.103 0.113 0.129 
0.065 0.246: 0.057 0.047 0.061 0.127 0.077 0.071 0.041 0.102 0.049 0.043 0.048 0.056 0.097 0.297: 0.127 0.150 0.120 0.144 0.138 0.169 0.090 0.096 0.057 0.046 0.060 0.121 
0.059 0.236: 0.032 0.053 0.049 0.039 0.060 0.054 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.074 0.078 0.067 0.092 0.289: 0.105 0.157 0.126 0.066 0.080 0.129 0.099 0.058 0.063 0.073 0.109 0.123 
0.359 0.48~ 0.386 0.448 0.429 0.356 0.389 0.243 0.337 0.326 0.311 0.330 0.479 0.35 0.281 0.450: 0.376 0.480 0.324 0.358 0.320 0.238 0.248 0.238 0.190 0.196 0.347 0.309 
0.239 0.165: 0.272 0.270 0.247 0.307 0.449 0.277 0.290 0.214 0.180 0.204 0.162 0.33 0.227 0.162: 0.256 0.256 0.235 0.291 0.440 0.258 0.277 0.206 0.170 0.196 0.153 0.315 
0.084 0.245: 0.102 0.114 0.079 0.126 0.265 0.108 0.123 0.063 0.048 0.060 0.041 0.148 0.078 0.21~ 0.092 0.093 0.075 0.118 0.263 0.097 0.112 0.060 0.043 0.057 0.039 0.133 
0.169 0.375: 0.216 0.213 0.183 0.212 0.199 0.162 0.180 0.169 0.159 0.119 0.136 0.188 0.145 0.352: 0.200 0.361 0.153 0.206 0.150 0.198 0.123 0.122 0.082 0.079 0.128 0.142 
0.763 0.425: 0.746 0.859 0.821 0.819 0.763 0.742 0.871 0.696 0.836 0.739 0.652 0.783 0.719 0.450: 0.728 0.827 0.767 0.759 0.710 0.743 0.850 0.640 0.812 0.689 0.542 0.774 
0.164 0.370. 0.224 0.241 0.199 0.133 0.190 0.249 0.142 0.096 0.102 0.173 0.172 0.191 0.172 0.377: 0.217 0.281 0.222 0.127 0.180 0.276 0.151 0.089 0.108 0.178 0.204 0.165 
0.137 0.344 0.186 0.135 0.173 0.124 0.182 0.161 0.115 0.115 0.104 0.108 0.166 0.173 0.154 0.361: 0.176 0.179 0.203 0.148 0.173 0.184 0.125 0.126 0.115 0.130 0.201 0.145 
0.069 0.254: 0.105 0.067 0.054 0.091 0.115 0.075 0.069 0.067 0.056 0.061 0.042 0.105 0.085 0.280: 0.124 0.109 0.089 0.107 0.138 0.112 0.101 0.075 0.056 0.067 0.045 0.140 
2.994 2.283: 3.389 3.748 3.466 3.214 3.589 2.641 2.713 2.737 2.875 2.566 3.057 3.71 1.873 2.346: 2.300 3.224 1.981 2.298 2.306 2.231 1.537 1.553 1.473 1.250 2.030 2.604 
0.191 0.39~ 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 O.ooq 0.194 0.396: 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.118 0.323: 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 o.ooq 0.119 0.32~ 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.224 0.417: 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.758 0.000 0.195 0.425 0.075 0.095 0.576 0.081 0.22~ 0.217 0.41Z: 0.000 0.340 0.000 0.761 0.000 0.177 0.434 0.050 0.071 0.572 0.070 0.196 
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Figure 1. Histograms of visits to the GP, SP and DENTIST by country and sex . 
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Figure 1. (cont.). Histograms of visits to the GP, SP and DENTIST by country and sex. 
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Figure 2. Age and income effect on the decision to visit the GP, SP or the DENTIST by country and sex . 
. prob. GP by men age • prob. SP by men age . prob. GP by women age • prob. SP by women age 
+ prob. DT by men age + prob. DT by women age 
Germany Denmark Netherlands Belgium le: '~::: ,::::; .~ H::::;:;;,~t;;::;:: :,:~ 
25 35 45 55 65 .t:;25:!!;35~45~55~6 25 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 65 
luxembourg U.K. Ireland Ilaly 
;e:::;:i::,:':;;: a;:::,:::::,:::::,:: n;:::~::~, H-:::':::-:7:;:-:'''':~:'::~. 
25 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 61 25 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 65 
Greece Spain Portugal Austria 
4~ .6 ____: _ •. ::~~:', '::= H:w ~( ·~:s;;=:;;;~ j:::;::.::::::=: 
2'5 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 6 0 25 35 45 55 6 25 35 45 55 65 
. prob. GP for men by hh inc. 
+ prob. DT for men by hh inc. 
age 
• prob. SP for men by hh inc. 
hh income (in 101\5 PPP) 
Germany H=::;;: 
25 35 45 55 65 
n~ :E:::::,::::;:::;:jf::·: ,;::;s :F:'",:,,§'; 
25 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 65 25 35 45 55 65 .2 2'5 3\ .'5 55 65 
Greece Spain Portugal Austria 
5~8l61~- •• ::1J$5;t:;,;;;::~::::=:=--=:::: .~~;r: ': i :;{:]:;::::::~ j. r~ 
HUg H U HUg H d HUg H d HUg H d 
age 
. prob. GP for women by hh inc. 
+ prob. DT for women by hh inc. 
• prob. SP for women by hh inc. 
30 
!t:~;;:';~:: '~:::;f:~" .,: '::' :;if\:;:;;~::'~ : :;.::~~~~:>;. :' ::;: ::; 
:{:':~'::':. ::':~::'~;:jf::;~::: ;~:::~::-;;::~f;.:d;' :;;" l~ 
1~:~~l~ i~ :~:,:~,:~ 
hh income (in 101\5 PPP) 
Figure 3. Age and income effect on the number of visit the GP, SP or the DENTIST by country and sex. 
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